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Abstract: Using a discrete choice experiment with real economic incentives, this 
paper studies one of the most well-known governmental mechanisms of nudging 
consumers towards a healthier way of eating, namely food fiscal policies. The 
experimental design varies food prices of healthier and unhealthier alternatives of 
food products for children as part of specific food fiscal policies. We also examine the 
interplay of children’s pestering power as well as information about the fiscal policies. 
Results from our lab experiment suggest that (a) implementing a fat tax and a subsidy 
simultaneously can nudge parents to choose healthier food products, (b) that 
providing information regarding the food fiscal policies in place can further increase 
the impact of the intervention, and (c) kid’s pestering power is one of the causes of the 
policies’ moderate effectiveness as it strongly affects parents in making unhealthier 
choices.   
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1 Introduction  
Overconsumption and excessive intake of sugar and fats along with sedentary 
lifestyles have been partly blamed for the worldwide obesity prevalence trend. 
Individual food choices are influenced by a wide variety of biological and 
environmental variables. Biological variables include hunger, taste, appetite; while 
environmental variables include economic determinants (cost, availability, income, 
access, and time), social determinants (socio-cultural status, meal patterns, peer and 
social networks), psychological determinants (mood, stress, guilt) and perceived 
nutrition determinants (knowledge about food, beliefs, attitudes) (The European Food 
Information Council (EUFIC), 2005). Individuals place different levels of importance 
on each of these evaluative dimensions.  
However, when transferring this framework from adults to children, an additional 
dimension must be taken into account. The food environment created by parents for 
children likely plays a more important role. Although adults have the freedom to 
make their own choices over energy intake and expenditure, the child’s choice set is 
limited by the environment created by their parents (Barlow and Dietz, 1998). In this 
respect, Cawley (2006) stresses that parental control and bounded rationality are of 
great importance for childhood obesity. Thus, nudging healthy behaviors at home 
could play an important role in helping children develop healthy eating habits at a 
young age and adopt them throughout their adulthood. Evidence shows that habits are 
formed early on in life and are then kept into adulthood (Kelder et al., 1994; Resnicow 
et al., 1988; Singer et al., 1995). Therefore, interventions that focus on nudging 
parental food choice behavior may help in this direction.  
Due to the substantial negative externalities for society involved with increasing 
obesity rates, several governments worldwide have intervened with various policies 
with the goal of influencing dietary habits. These include fiscal (OECD, 2012), 
marketing/informational (Beaudoin et al., 2007; Maes et al., 2012), and educational 
policies (Cross-Government Obesity Unit, 2008; New York City Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene, 2008) that aim to nudge people to make healthier food 
choices. In the literature, fiscal policies (i.e., those that limit access and provide price 
incentives and disincentives) have received great attention with respect to their 
effectiveness in improving dietary patterns (Thow et al., 2010). Generally, three types 
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of price strategies have been applied: increasing unhealthy food prices (fat tax), 
decreasing healthy food prices (often called a thin subsidy) and a combination of both 
(Waterlander et al., 2012a).  
Among the three fiscal policies mentioned above, great political as well as scientific 
attention has been given to examining the effect of price increases of unhealthy 
products. This price increase can be levied either by increasing the value added tax 
(VAT) or by imposing an additional (fat) tax. Leicester and Windmeijer (2004) note 
that this policy can be implemented in two ways. One way is by taxing certain types 
of products of low nutritional value such as soft drinks and snacks (Bowman, 1999). 
Another way is by taxing a variety of products based on their nutritional composition, 
i.e. percentage of fat, salt, calories, etc. The first way of taxation has been applied to 
alcohol and tobacco (“sin taxes”) which are taxed based on their effects on human 
health. Those who support the first way of taxation, i.e. taxation of certain food 
categories which are widely recognized for their low nutritional value, argue that it is 
more politically feasible or practical for the legislative bodies than the second one 
(Jacobson and Brownell, 2000). Moreover, Jacobson and Brownell  (2000) claim that 
the implementation of the second way of taxation could affect consumers unfairly. For 
example, some nutrient contents such as lipids/fat are classified as unhealthy even 
though they can be important components of a daily diet when consumed in 
recommended amounts. However, opponents of this policy also claim that the policy 
is ineffective and unfair (Salois and Tiffin, 2010). It is ineffective because wealthy 
consumers are not very responsive to food prices and because of its regressive nature 
which costs the poor relatively more than the rich. The argument is that taxing food 
would further reduce the disposable income of the poor as taxation is implemented on 
foods with high percentages of fats, sugar and calories, which are consumed 
disproportionately by low-income households (Frazao et al., 2007). This happens 
because unhealthy foods are generally cheaper than healthy foods (Waterlander et al., 
2010), which makes them more affordable for low socioeconomic status households 
(Pieroni et al., 2013).  In addition, this policy is unfair because it punishes both those 
who are obese as well as those who are not. 
The second fiscal policy, i.e. reducing the price of products considered healthy, can be 
applied in a similar manner. This would be possible either by reducing the prices of 
specific product categories that are considered healthy (such as salads, fruits, etc.) or 
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by reducing the prices of products which have lower amounts of certain nutrients such 
as fat and sugar. These reductions can be made directly on product’s price or through 
discount coupons. Thus, healthy products could become more accessible to the 
average consumer and researchers conclude that this could lead to increased 
consumption of healthy products as well (Andreyeva et al., 2010; Ni Mhurchu et al., 
2000; Waterlander et al., 2012b). Some evidence, however, shows that this policy 
leads to more calorie purchases because consumers buy larger quantities of healthy 
products (Epstein et al., 2010; Waterlander et al., 2012a) or that it is 
counterproductive because consumers use the saved money to purchase unhealthier 
products (Giesen et al., 2012). This behavior could be explained using the familiar 
concepts of income and substitution effects (McInnes and Ozturk, 2011). Subsidizing 
healthy products, ceteris paribus, makes the consumer wealthier and thus the 
consumer has proportionately more disposable income to spend (either on more 
calories or less healthy products). The reduced efficacy of this policy compared with 
the taxation of unhealthy products could also be explained using insights from 
behavioral economics such as reference dependence and loss aversion (McInnes and 
Ozturk, 2011). Specifically, reference dependence refers to options being valued as 
gains and losses relative to a reference point while loss aversion refers to people’s 
tendency to strongly prefer avoidance of losses than acquiring gains (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1984). Therefore, consumers weigh losses more heavily from the purchase 
of a taxed unhealthy product than equivalent gains from the purchase of a subsidized 
healthy product. 
Given the pros and cons of the two policy options discussed above, a third policy that 
combines these two policies could be considered. This policy can be designed to be 
revenue neutral so that the subsidy exactly offsets the revenue from the fat tax (Salois 
and Tiffin, 2011). Furthermore, this policy seems to combine the benefits of the two 
previous policies (i.e., reduction of sales of unhealthy products and increased sales of 
healthy products) and overcomes the negative side effects (purchase of more calories, 
use of the saved money to purchase unhealthier products and being regressive to the 
poor) (Powell and Chaloupka, 2009; Waterlander et al., 2012a). 
However, the literature provides contradictory results on the efficacy of these policies 
as a health intervention tool. In fact, even though fiscal policies may be beneficial in 
nudging healthier choices, it may not be sufficient by itself to alter long-term overall 
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purchasing behavior as any reduction in taxed products may be offset by consumption 
of calories from other sources (Fletcher et al., 2010b). Results from a number of 
studies suggest that rising price through taxation or decreasing price through subsidy 
could be an effective means of shifting food consumption away from unhealthy food 
towards healthier alternatives not only among adults (Andreyeva et al., 2010; Dong 
and Lin, 2009; Epstein et al., 2012; French, 2003; Goldman et al., 2011; Powell and 
Chaloupka, 2009; Waterlander et al., 2012a) but also among young children and 
adolescents (French et al., 2001; French et al., 2003; Hannan et al., 2002).  
However, fiscal policies have provoked many opposing opinions among researchers 
regarding their effectiveness on obesity prevalence. One reason is that substantial 
price changes (from taxes and subsidies) have to be implemented in order to detect 
significant associations between fiscal policies and weight outcomes (Fletcher et al., 
2010a; Lin et al., 2011; Powell and Chaloupka, 2009). For example, Smith et al. 
(2010) found that a 20% tax included in the price of soft drinks would reduce the 
child at-risk-for-overweight prevalence from 32.2% to 27.0% and the overweight 
prevalence from 16.6% to 13.7%. In contrast, Schroeter et al. (2008) demonstrated a 
case where a tax on food away from home could actually increase weight. These 
controversial results suggest the need for further research that evaluates whether 
changes in prices influence not only short term consumption behaviour but also body 
weight (Jacobson and Brownell, 2000; Schroeter et al., 2008).      
While there is an extensive literature on the impact of information on demand for 
food, there is scant literature on the causal effect of information on the effectiveness 
of food fiscal policies. It is well established that information can help consumers 
better evaluate the value of goods and services they are interested in, resulting in more 
appropriate purchases.  It can also significantly help buyers choose which market to 
participate in, and it can affect demand elasticity (Johnson and Myatt, 2006; Lewis, 
2011; Tadelis and Zettelmeyer, 2011). Ashraf et al. (2013) examined information and 
subsidy as complements in health interventions and found that  information can 
significantly increase the impact of price subsidies on purchases of healthy products 
(the impact of price subsidies was 60% larger among the informed households). 
All the above evidence on the effectiveness of health related food price incentives and 
disincentives comes from three sources: natural experiments, controlled trials of price 
changes in closed environments, and modelling studies (Mytton et al., 2012). To our 
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knowledge, there are only a handful of studies that performed controlled experiments 
over food purchases under different fiscal policies and these studies come with some 
caveats. For example, two such studies  (Epstein et al., 2010; Nederkoorn et al., 2011) 
lack enforcement of real incentives since both the purchases and the budget for the 
purchases were hypothetical. Another set of studies (Epstein et al., 2006; Epstein et 
al., 2007) lacks sufficient statistical power since they employed small sample sizes 
(10 and 47 couples of mother-child, respectively).  Our emphasis on experimental 
research is based on our belief that this kind of research can further enhance the 
contribution of economics on evaluating public interventions and hence improving 
public health.  
Our aim in this study is to identify some factors either inside or outside the home 
environment that can either weaken or enhance the expected outcomes of fiscal 
policies on food choices, through a controlled laboratory experiment. We focus on 
how parents choose between healthier and unhealthier food items for their child under 
different fiscal pricing policies. Furthermore, we evaluate how factors like the 
provision of information on fiscal policies and child’s pestering power, may influence 
parental food choices. Our experiment further contributes to the literature by 
providing an empirical examination of parents’ choices between healthier and 
unhealthier alternatives when it comes to children’s food products. To our knowledge, 
this is the first time a study has examined children’s pestering power on parents’ 
choices in the context of a lab experiment on food choices. This allows us to examine 
how fiscal pricing policies and external influences can affect food choice behavior. 
The question we ask in this paper is whether incentives can affect parental food 
choice behavior. We examined these effects through the recruitment of 189 parent-
child pairs in a controlled laboratory choice experiment where we created an 
experimental market with real food products where parents actually had to purchase 
products presented under different pricing schemes. Our sample consisted of four 
within subject treatments and four between subject treatments.  In the within subjects 
treatments, each participant faced 12 choice tasks. In each choice task, we displayed 
two food-for-kids products with different levels of healthiness and a no-buy option. 
The participants chose their preferred alternative in each choice task. Between choice 
tasks, the prices varied according to a base (market price) level and three different 
fiscal policies levels (i.e., fat tax, subsidy, fat tax and subsidy at the same time). To 
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induce real economic incentives, one of the choice tasks was randomly drawn as 
binding at the end of the experiment and the participant had to buy the food product 
chosen in the binding task. In addition to the within subjects treatments, there were 
four between subjects treatments. The control treatment was as described above. The 
second treatment (the information treatment) was similar to the control treatment but 
with the addition of information regarding the food fiscal policies. The third treatment 
(the pestering power treatment) was similar to the control treatment but now the 
parent chose together with their child in each choice task while the final treatment 
was like the pestering power treatment but we also added information to the 
participants about the food fiscal policies (pestering power + information treatment).   
Our results make three substantive contributions to the literature. We found that the 
intervention by itself has a moderate effect on parent’s food choices. In particular, a 
fat tax or a subsidy can increase healthier choices but the simultaneous 
implementation of both fat tax and subsidy can further improve healthier choices 
among parents. Our second result is that when information regarding the applied food 
fiscal policies is available, healthier choices can increase the impact of the 
intervention even further. Therefore, it appears that the lack of proper provision of 
information is one of the causes of the policy’s moderate effectiveness. Third, we find 
that kid’s pestering power strongly affects parents in making unhealthier choices. 
The rest of article proceeds as follows: first, we present the design of the experiment 
and the experimental procedures as well as information about our sample and 
products used in the study (section 2). Section 3 illustrates the results drawn from the 
descriptive and econometric analysis, and we conclude with the importance and the 
implications of the findings in the last section (section 4).   
 
2 Experiment 
2.1 Experimental Design  
Table 1 exhibits the four within and four between subjects treatments used in the 
study, along with the number of parent-child pairs that participated in each treatment. 
Each cell in the table represents a between-subject treatment. Within each cell, the 
four within subjects treatments are listed which correspond to the price variations 
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caused by the four fiscal policies: (1) a baseline scenario of market prices, (2) a fat 
tax, (3) a subsidy, and (4) a fat tax and subsidy applied simultaneously (the both 
treatment). The between subjects treatments vary the decision environment (parent 
goes through the choice tasks with or without the presence of the child which 
corresponds to the with and without pestering power treatments) and information 
provision (where the parent is provided with information about the fiscal policies or 
not, hereafter referred to as the info and no info treatments). All sessions were 
conducted by a single experimenter i.e., one of the authors and the experiment was 
conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
 
Table 1. Experimental design 
 No information for fiscal policy 
Information for fiscal 
policy 
Without 
pestering power  
47 
Market price, Fat tax, 
Subsidy, Both 
47 
Market price, Fat tax, 
Subsidy, Both 
With pestering 
power  
47 
Market price, Fat tax, 
Subsidy, Both 
48 
Market price, Fat tax, 
Subsidy, Both 
2.1.1 The role of food fiscal policies  
Our experiment allows us to study the role of food fiscal policies as a tool that can 
influence healthier food purchasing behavior. We varied within subjects the posted 
prices of the products according to four within-subjects treatments. The market price 
(MP) treatment was always displayed first in order to create a common reference 
point to all subjects. In this treatment, the healthier and unhealthier versions of a 
product on any given choice task were set to the same level. The price level was set to 
the average value of market prices we found in major supermarket chains prior to the 
experiment. After the MP treatment, the three food fiscal policies (three treatments) 
followed in random order to avoid order effects. The only thing that was varied in 
these treatments was prices for the products (see Table 2). One of the treatments 
imposed a fat tax on the price of the unhealthier product (as judged by the fat or sugar 
content) while keeping the price of the healthier product constant at market price (FT 
treatment). Another treatment imposed a subsidy on the price of the healthier product 
keeping the price of the unhealthier product constant at market price (SB treatment). 
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The third treatment combined a fat tax on the price of the unhealthier product with a 
subsidy on the healthier product (BO treatment).  
 
Table 2. Overview of the within subjects treatments 
Treatment Description 
Control Treatment 
Prices are set to the average value of market prices we 
found in major supermarket chains prior to the experiment. 
Prices are equal between the healthier and unhealthier 
alternative. 
Fat tax (FT) 
Treatment 
Fat tax on the unhealthier alternative (25% increase on the 
market price) 
Subsidy (SB) 
Treatment 
Subsidy on the healthier alternative (25% decrease on the 
market price) 
Both (BO) 
Treatment 
Fat tax on the unhealthier alternative and subsidy on the 
healthier alternative at the same time (25% increase on the 
market price of the unhealthier product & 25% decrease on 
the market price of the healthier product) 
 
The full list of choice tasks displayed in the four within-subjects treatments is listed in 
Appendix A. 
 
2.1.2 The role of provision of information 
Our rational for including a (between-subjects) provision of information treatment is 
that information regarding the relation of a price change and the healthiness of a 
product can potentially alter purchase behavior. Such information provision can be 
enacted using several methods, including mass media, governmental/community-level 
agents’ announcements and informative labels on the shelves next to the price. In the 
context of our laboratory experiment a labeling scheme was more realistic. Therefore, 
in the information treatment, subjects were informed on the actual reason on why a 
price change occurred (e.g., implementation of a fat tax or a subsidy or both) using a 
descriptive label on the top of the screen. In the no-information treatment, subjects 
remained unaware of the actual reason of the price increases/decreases. 
 
 10
2.1.3 The role of kid’s pestering power  
Our second between-subjects treatment examined the role of making food purchasing 
decisions together with the child. While a parent may rationally choose to purchase a 
healthier product for their child, the mere presence of a child could adversely affect 
purchase decisions if the parent decides to give in to the child’s demands (which may 
be motivated by factors other than nutrition). To vary the child’s ability to potentially 
pester the parents on their choices (i.e., hereon referred to as child’s pestering power), 
we allowed children in half of the sessions to seat next to their parent while the parent 
was going through the choice tasks. The child and the parent could freely 
communicate and discuss about the choice options1. In the no pestering power 
treatments, the parent decided on their own without any external influence from the 
child. Hence, in these treatments, the child did not participate in the choice tasks and 
was kept engaged in the lab’s lobby where he/she could watch cartoons or draw using 
paper and pencils.  
 
2.2  Participants 
A random sample of families (one adult who is the primary grocery shopper and 
makes the household meal decisions and one child) from the general population of 
Athens, Greece, was recruited by a market recruitment research company based on 
random digit dialing. The research company ensured that the interested families met 
the following study criteria: (1) the child in the family was between the ages of 6 and 
102 (if there was more than 1 child in the family in this particular age range, the 
company randomly picked one child) and (2) the family consumed the products used 
in the study moderately or more often (parents were screened for consumption 
patterns from a large list of food and stationery products, which included the products 
used in our study, so that we would avoid any prior associations with the aims of the 
study. Subjects were offered a fixed fee of 30€ per family to participate in a 
“children’s snack and stationery preference study”, conducted in the experimental 
economics laboratory of the Agricultural University of Athens. A total of 189 families 
                                                 
1 We observed that in the pestering power treatment all children interacted with their parent.  
2 We chose this specific age range because, on the one hand, children of this age range have almost no 
pocket money and are totally dependent on what their parents purchase for them while, on the other 
hand, they are old enough to accompany parents at the supermarket. 
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participated in the experiment. Subjects participated in one of the 4 between subject 
treatments and they were randomly assigned to a time slot between July 2012 and 
September 2012. Experimental sessions were split between morning (97 sessions) and 
afternoon (92 sessions) snack time hours, i.e., from 9.00-13.00 o’clock and 16.00-
20.00 o’clock each day of the week except Sundays3. All subjects were given a short 
orientation and training before the experiment begun. 
 
2.3 Experimental procedures  
Each experimental session consisted of four tasks. It included a real choice 
experiment (RCE), a manipulation check questionnaire, a socio-demographic 
questionnaire and anthropometric measurements. Each session lasted approximately 
40 minutes. In each session a single parent-child pair participated. Depending on the 
treatment, the child could have an active role in the choice experiment or not. 
In the RCE task, participants faced different choice tasks where they had to choose 
between two similar products of the same brand (e.g., cheese) differentiated by their 
healthiness status (healthier vs. unhealthier alternative) and price (three levels). The 
healthiness or unhealthiness status was not explicitly labeled as such. Choices also 
included a no-buy option in the event that subjects did not prefer any of the products4.  
The experiment was conducted as follows: first, each parent was assigned a unique ID 
number to guarantee his/her anonymity and s/he was informed that their fixed 
participation fee of 30€ would be given to them at the end of the experiment. In 
addition, subjects could examine the products offered for sale in a display section in 
the lab. They were given enough time to see and inspect all products. Subjects were 
then seated in front of a computer and they were informed that they will go through 
20 choice tasks showing various combinations of the products on display in the lab. 
They were also informed that when they complete all choice tasks, one of these would 
be chosen as binding and they would have to purchase the product of their choice at 
the indicated price. The price of the product would be deducted from their 
                                                 
3 Lunch and dinner time in Greece are usually later than other parts of Europe or North America. Lunch 
is usually served between 13.30 and 15.00 o’clock while dinner between 20.00 and 21.30. Two parent-
child pairs participated in the experiment at 14.00 and 14.45 o’clock because they were late and early, 
respectively.  
4 According to Louviere and Street (2000) it is not realistic to force participants to choose one of the 
available options and therefore including a no-buy option is to be preferred.  
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participation fee. To determine the binding round, subjects had to draw a number from 
a jar with folded papers listing numbers from one to twenty (as many as the choice 
tasks). To make sure parents were choosing products for their child, they were told 
that the product would be given to their child right away to consume while s/he would 
be filling out the socio-demographic questionnaire. We emphasized to subjects that 
actual payment would occur for the binding choice task and that they should evaluate 
each choice task carefully, since all tasks were equally likely to become binding. 
Subjects were also told that choosing the “none of these” option (i.e., the no-buy 
option) is an acceptable choice and that if they had chosen the no-buy option in a 
binding task, no purchase would be made and they would keep their full endowment. 
The exact instructions given to the participants are provided in Appendix B. 
In order to confirm that our experiment worked well, that there was no experimenter 
demand effect and participants adhered to the experimental instructions, we 
incorporated a manipulation check questionnaire right after the choice experiment was 
finished (see Appendix C for more details)5. 
The socio-demographic questionnaire, which elicited parental perceptions about their 
child’s weight status, family’s dietary habits, and family’s socio-demographics, were 
addressed to parents.  
Each session concluded with anthropometric measurements of the parent and the 
child.  Physical measurements of body weight and height were obtained from all 
children and their parents (light summer clothing, no shoes). Body weight was 
measured on a levelled platform scale with a beam, movable weights and body height 
on a wall-mounted stadiometer, to the nearest 0.5 kg and 0.5 cm, respectively. Body 
Mass Index (BMI) was computed as weight (in kilograms) divided by height (in 
meters squared) and it was used for participants’ classification as normal-weight, 
overweight or obese (Cole et al., 2000; Cole et al., 2007; WHO, 1995).    
 
                                                 
5 The results of the manipulation check questionnaire reinforce the validity of our experimental results. 
All subjects in the information treatment responded that their responses were based on the information 
given at the beginning of the session along with what s/he and/or their child wanted; not based on what 
they thought the experimenter wanted from them. All subjects in the no-information treatment 
responded that the purpose of the study was to examine consumption patterns on food and/or stationery 
products for kids.    
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2.4 Products and choice tasks  
The food products chosen were products commonly purchased by Greek families as 
snacks for children. In each product category (choco milk beverage, cheese, and 
yogurt) there were two products of the same size and weight that differed only on the 
basis of percentage of calories, fat and sugar and so it was easy for parents to 
distinguish between the healthier and the unhealthier alternative (for example all 
healthier products carried nutritional claims such as “free”, “2%”, “light”). We did not 
explicitly mention, however, if a product would be considered more or less healthy. 
We also did not label any of the products as such. Each choice task depicted the 
alternative products using photo stimuli. To mute any brand effects, we chose 
products of the same brand in each product category, that is, each pair of healthier and 
unhealthier products were of the same brand6. One week before the official start of the 
experiment, the experimenter visited supermarkets of the four largest chain stores in 
the city and collected prices for the products of the experiment. The average of these 
prices was used in the baseline control (market price) treatment and prices for the 
other within-subjects treatments varied accordingly.  
To cover up the aim of the study and preclude subjects from potentially succumbing 
to experimenter demand effects, two additional non-food categories were added to the 
list of choice tasks. We used stationery products (colored markers, pens/pencils) as a 
decoy. The prices of the decoy products in the market price treatment were the 
average of prices observed in the same four supermarkets as the food items. Decoy 
products were selected so that their price range lied between the lowest and the 
highest price of the market prices of food products, in order to avoid exposing 
subjects to any irrelevant price anchors. Prices did not change for the decoy products 
under the fat tax, subsidy and both treatments since the fiscal policies were irrelevant 
for stationery products.  
In all, the real choice experiment incorporated 20 different choice tasks [4 within 
subject treatments (MP, FT, SB and BO)  5 product categories (3 food and 2 non-
food)]. The choice tasks pertaining to the stationery products will not be further 
analyzed. Appendix D shows sample choice screens from the market price treatment. 
In the rest of the within-subjects treatments, prices were adjusted accordingly.  
                                                 
6 The products were: milko vs. milko free, babybel vs. babybel light, delta yogurt vs. delta yogurt 2%. 
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3 Results 
3.1 Descriptive analysis 
Before proceeding with testing our hypotheses, insights can be gained by looking at 
some descriptive statistics. We first explore whether randomization to treatment 
worked by testing whether observable characteristic are balanced across the between 
subjects treatments. With respect to the socio-economic status of families, results 
from an ANOVA test indicate that the parents’ age (mean=40.48 years old) as well as 
children’s age (mean=8.16 years old) do not differ significantly between treatments 
(p-value=0.41 and 0.86 respectively). Kruskal-Wallis tests produce similar results 
with respect to parents’ and children’s age. In addition, Pearson’s χ2 tests indicate that 
the distribution of parents’ gender as well as children’s gender are not significantly 
different between treatments (χ2 =2.51, p-value=0.47 and χ2 =2.35, p-value=0.50, 
respectively).  
Given that parent-children pairs would have different compositions (i.e., father-son, 
father-daughter, mother-son, mother-daughter), a question that might arise is whether 
the proportions of parent-child gender combinations differ across the treatments. We 
cannot reject the null of no difference between treatments (Pearson’s χ2 =10.85, p-
value=0.29).  
In  addition, our between subject treatments do not differ in terms of income level 
(Kruskal Wallis χ2=1.15, p-value=0.77), education level (Kruskal Wallis χ2=1.37, p-
value=0.71), family’s geographical location residence (Pearson’s χ2=6.95, p-
value=0.96), working status (Pearson’s χ2=7.35, p-value=0.83), marital status 
(Pearson’s χ2=9.66, p-value=0.38) and smoking status (Pearson’s χ2=5.51, p-value = 
0.79). We also classified individuals according to parental weight status using Body 
Mass Index (WHO, 1995). Results show that 31% of those in our parent sample have 
a healthy weight status, 37% are overweight and 32% are obese. A Pearson’s χ2 of 
whether the distribution of weight status differs between treatments does not reject the 
null (χ2 =3.86, p-value=0.69). We get a similar null effect if we use the raw BMI 
measurements (instead of the BMI categories) with an ANOVA test (p-value=0.85) as 
well as a Kruskal Wallis test (p-value=0.78). As far as child’s weight status is 
concerned, we used the International Obesity Task Force (IOTF) cut offs (Cole et al., 
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2000) to categorize children into weight categories. Our children sample consists of 
61% children of healthy weight status, 28% of overweight children and 11% obese. 
None of our results changes when we use Centers for Disease Control (CDC) cut offs  
(CDC, 2009) since the distribution of weight categories did not significantly change. 
In particular, a Fisher’s exact test of whether the distribution of weight status 
according to Cole measurement differs between treatments does not reject the null 
hypothesis (p-value=0.61). Similar results are given by a Pearson’s χ2 test when we 
use the weight status classification according to CDC (χ2=4.29, p-value=0.64). Results 
from the use of the raw BMI (instead of BMI categories) produces the same null 
effect (ANOVA test, p-value= 0.33, Kruskal Wallis test, p-value=0.19).  
Before moving to the econometric analysis, it is also important to have a first look at 
the raw choices of subjects. Subjects had to choose among three alternatives in each 
choice set. They could select the unhealthier alternative, the healthier alternative or 
none of the two alternatives. Our priors are that if parents are aware that a product for 
children has been taxed because it is unhealthier compared to others, it may 
discourage purchases of it; or if they are aware that a product has been subsidized 
because it is considered healthier than other products, it may enhance purchases of it. 
Overall, we expect that when information is provided about products whose price has 
been changed according to some fiscal policy, the purchasing behavior of parents 
would shift to healthier product choices. This hypothesis is confirmed by a proportion 
test when we test for differences in choices when information about fiscal policies is 
provided. For example, while 36% of choices are allocated to the healthier alternative 
in the “No pester - No info” treatment, the proportion rises to 72% in the “No pester - 
Info” treatment. This difference is statistically significant when we test using a 
proportions test (p-value<0.001). Similar behavior is observed in the “pester” 
treatments where choices shift from 21% to 58% to the healthier alternative when 
information about fiscal policies is provided. These are clear cut evidence that 
communicating the nature of the fiscal policy has a positive and significant effect on 
healthier choices. In both cases, the percentage of healthier choices increases more 
than twice.  
On the other hand, children’s pestering power has a negative effect on healthier 
choices. In the “No info” treatment, allowing the child to be able to communicate its 
preferences to the parent results in a significant decline of healthier purchases from 
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36% to 21% (p-value<0.001). Similarly, in the “Info” treatment, healthier choices 
decline from 72% to 58% (p-value<0.001) when children can exercise pestering 
power. In sum, we find that information about fiscal policies and pestering power can 
have opposite effects. The incidence of healthier choices increases when information 
is provided and children cannot exercise their pestering power.   
To illustrate this further, Figure 1 graphs the proportion of healthier and unhealthier 
choices by treatment. The graphs ignore non-choices given the low number 
throughout our experiment (only 20 choices were non-choices out of 2268 choices 
that the 189 subjects did in our experiment). 
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percent
Pester – Info
Pester – No Info
No Pester – Info
No Pester – No Info
Healthier vs. unhealthier choices by treatment
Unhealthier choice Healthier choice
 
Figure 1. Healthier and unhealthier choices by (between-subjects) treatments 
 
To examine the effect of specific fiscal policies (i.e., fat tax, subsidy or both) on 
healthier choices, Figure 2 displays the proportions of healthier and unhealthier 
choices by fiscal policy. The market price treatments are the benchmark (control 
treatments). It is clear that a) imposing fat tax or subsidy leads to increased healthier 
choices and b) imposing fat tax and subsidy at the same time can further improve 
healthier choices. We should pinpoint that healthier choices can go up to 83% of all 
choices when a fat tax and a subsidy are combined, when subjects receive information 
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about fiscal policies, and children cannot exercise pestering power. In the case when 
information about fiscal policies is provided and there is pestering power, healthier 
choices go down to 71%. Finally, it is important to mention that even when 
information is not available and the kid is present (the two factors that favor 
unhealthier purchases), the combination of a fat tax and a subsidy produce the largest 
percentage of healthier choices when compared with the other fiscal policies (which 
amounts to 28%).    
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No Pester – Info
No Pester – No Info
Market prices
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Unhealthier choice Healthier choice
 
Figure 2. Healthier and unhealthier choices by (within-subjects) treatments 
 
3.2 Econometric analysis 
To check whether the insights gained from the descriptive analysis above hold under 
the scrutiny of conditional analysis, we estimated  a mixed logit model [also referred 
to as the “random parameter logit model” or “mixed multinomial logit model” 
(Hensher et al., 2005)]. The mixed logit model solves three primary limitations of the 
standard logit model. It allows for random taste variation, unrestricted substitution 
pattern and correlation in unobserved factors over time (Train, 2003). McFadden and 
Train (2000) showed that under mild regularity conditions, a mixed logit model can 
calculate to any degree of accuracy any random utility model of discrete choice.   
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We assume that a sampled individual (n = 1,…, Ν) faces a choice among i alternatives 
in each of s choice tasks. The utility associated with each alternative i, as evaluated by 
each individual n in choice task s, is represented by the following model: 
 nis n nis nisU x                          (1) 
where xnis is the full vector of explanatory variables that are observed by the analyst; 
n   is a vector of fixed and random coefficients across individuals parameters; and εnis 
is an i.i.d. extreme value error term.  
In our experiment, the participants were asked to make 12 choices between dairy 
products offered at various pricing levels. The choices can be analyzed using the 
following mixed logit model: 
0 1 2 3 4 5ni+ +nis ni i ni nisU ChocoMilk Cheese Price Info Pester                      (2) 
where 0ni is the alternative specific constant (ASC) for alternative i; ChocoMilk and 
Cheese are product dummies (Yoghurt is the excluded category); Price is the price of 
the products; Info is a dummy variable for when information about the fiscal policies 
are provided to subjects; and Pester is a dummy variable indicating the treatment 
where the parent-child pair choose together (allowing the child to exercise pestering 
power). 
The coefficient 0ni  captures parents’ sensitivity to the health attribute and we model 
this as a random parameter that is triangularly distributed7.  The coefficients of Info 
and Pester, which capture consumers’ sensitivity to information provision and child’s 
pestering power, are modelled as random and triangularly distributed as well. The 
parameters 1 2 3, ,    are non-random and capture consumer sensitivity towards 
product category and price changes. Finally, the alternative-specific constant for the 
“none-of-these” alternative is normalized to zero.  
Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients of the parameters and respective standard 
errors from the estimated model of equation (2) (mixed logit (1) columns). For 
                                                 
7 We tried several other distributions for the random coefficients of our model like the normal and the 
uniform distribution. Differences between models with different distributions for the random 
coefficients are negligible. We only report results from the models with triangular distribution because 
it is a limited distribution and therefore it does not imply that anyone has an unlimited high willingness 
to pay for snacks (Alfnes et al., 2006). See Hensher and Greene (2003) for a discussion on the various 
distributions in mixed logit models.  
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comparison, a multinomial logit model is also displayed as well as a mixed logit 
model for which only the alternative specific constants are modeled as random (mixed 
logit (2) columns). We can see that both the mixed logit models (LL= -1127.017 and 
LL= -1126.947) are an improvement to the more restrictive multinomial logit model 
(LL=-1394.050). Likelihood ratio tests indicate the mixed logit model (1) is to be 
preferred than the multinomial logit model (χ2=534.07, p-value<0.001). A similar 
result is obtained when we compare the mixed logit model (2) with the multinomial 
logit model (χ2=534.21, p-value<0.001). On the other hand, the two mixed logit 
models do equally well (χ2=0.14, p-value=0.998). AIC values support these 
conclusions. Note that the two mixed models are qualitatively and quantitatively 
indistinguishable in terms of the estimated coefficients8.  
The alternative specific constants represent the utility of the alternatives (unhealthier-
healthier) at base level and the alternative with the highest utility on the base level is 
the unhealthier alternative, namely ASCU, which is significantly higher than the 
healthier alternative (Wald test-statistic: χ2=46.69, p-value<0.001). The product 
dummies have no effect on the utilities of the alternatives. Furthermore, the 
coefficient of the Price variable for both the healthier and unhealthier alternatives is 
negative, as one would normally expect.  
The coefficient of the information variable for the healthier alternative is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, while for the unhealthier alternative, it is not 
statistically significant and of small magnitude. This means that providing information 
about fiscal policies affects the utility of the healthier alternative much more than the 
utility of the unhealthier alternative. A similar pattern in terms of statistical 
significance is observed for the child’s pestering power coefficients. The pestering 
power dummy has a negative statistically significant effect for the healthier alternative 
but is not significant and is of small magnitude for the unhealthier alternative.  
 
                                                 
8 We also estimated models that included a time of the session dummy (morning vs. afternoon sessions) 
to control for time of the day differences. The dummy was never statistically significant and of small 
magnitude. In addition, likelihood ratio tests indicate that the model with the time of the day dummy 
does not significantly improve the fit of the model (χ2=0.928, p-value=0.629). 
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Table 3. Estimated parameters for the multinomial logit and mixed logit models 
Multinomial logit Mixed logit (1) Mixed logit (2) 
Variable Coefficient S.E. Variable Coefficient S.E. Variable Coefficient S.E.
ASCU 8.251*** 1.056 ASCU (R) 10.388*** 1.120 ASCU (R) 10.434*** 1.121 
ASCH 7.040*** 1.054 ASCH (R) 8.197*** 1.121 ASCH (R) 8.196*** 1.125 
ChocoMilk -1.621 1.052 ChocoMilk -1.235 1.060 ChocoMilk -1.237 1.060 
Cheese 0.121 1.074 Cheese 1.566 1.099 Cheese 1.562 1.099 
PriceU -2.178*** 0.179 PriceU -3.505*** 0.249 PriceU -3.504*** 0.249 
PriceH -2.348*** 0.217 PriceH -3.756*** 0.294 PriceH -3.755*** 0.294 
InfoU 0.970 0.631 InfoU (R) 0.662 0.703 InfoU 0.606 0.694 
InfoH 2.683*** 0.632 InfoH (R) 3.803*** 0.742 InfoH 3.781*** 0.743 
PesterU 0.061 0.456 PesterU (R) 0.210 0.540 PesterU 0.201 0.540 
PesterH -0.673 0.459 PesterH (R) -1.239** 0.603 PesterH -1.238** 0.593 
Log likelihood -1394.050  -1127.017  -1126.947 
AIC 2808.100  2286.034  2277.894 
N 2268 
    Note: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
    (R): Denotes random coefficient for the respective variable. 
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Given that the estimates of the coefficients from the mixed logit model are 
meaningless for quantitative interpretations, we also calculated the effect of changes 
in prices on the choice probabilities for each of the alternatives (see Table 4). Since 
market prices between the three products differ, we simulated the fiscal policy 
changes separately for each product. Results show that changing the food fiscal policy 
for the choco milk beverage from a basic level of market prices to imposing a 15% fat 
tax, increases choices of the healthier alternative by 6.8% and decreases choices of the 
unhealthier alternative by 7.07%. The effect is proportional to a 25% fat tax and 
results in a 11.25% increase in healthier choices and a 11.8% decrease in unhealthier 
choices. The results from a corresponding subsidy of the healthier alternative show 
that the effect is even stronger in increasing the incidence of healthier choices. For 
example, a 25% subsidization of the price of the healthier cheese alternative results in 
a 19.6% increase in the healthier choice share while the equivalent fat tax imposed on 
the unhealthier alternative results in a 15.6% increase in the healthier choice share. 
This indicates that the implementation of a subsidy is more effective than the 
implementation of a fat tax in increasing healthier choices, at least in the context of 
our experiment.   
 
Table 4. Two scenarios of fiscal policies and their effects on choice probabilities (%) 
 
Choco Milk Cheese Yogurt 
FT SB BO FT SB BO FT SB BO 
25% 
U -11.79 -12.16 -24.57 -21.41 -18.14 -38.52 -9.09 -9.65 -19.03 
H 11.25 12.25 24.29 15.61 19.62 35.97 8.96 9.68 18.95 
N 0.54 -0.09 .028 5.80 -1.48 2.55 0.13 -0.3 0.08 
15% 
U -7.07 -7.35 -14.65 -12.49 -10.51 -23.09 -5.36 -5.68 -11.31 
H 6.81 7.42 14.48 9.36 11.39 21.77 5.29 5.70 11.28 
N 0.26 -0.07 0.17 3.13 -0.88 1.32 0.07 -0.02 0.03 
Note: H: Healthier alternative, U: Unhealthier alternative, N: Non of these 
FT: Change price from market price to fat tax, SB: Change price from market price to subsidy, BO: 
Change price from market price to both policies. 
 
The combined effect of a fat tax and a subsidy is even more robust. The most 
prominent case is for the cheese product where a 25% fat tax on the unhealthier 
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alternative and a 25% subsidy on the healthier alternative increase (decrease) the 
choice share of the healthier (unhealthier) alternative by 36% (38.5%).   
 
4 Conclusion  
Given the rapid rise in obesity especially among children, policymakers and 
academics have proposed a large number of policy measures to halt or reverse this 
trend. Some of the most well known mechanisms are food fiscal policies which may 
be used to nudge consumers towards a healthier way of eating. In this paper, we 
studied the effects of such policies within the family environment which is extremely 
important given that adult eating habits are acquired during childhood (Birch, 1988; 
Kelder et al., 1994; Lien et al., 2001). Thus, children are more apt to adopt healthier 
eating behaviour while they grow up under a healthy parental food “umbrella”. We 
focus on parental food choices since young children’s choices are normally 
constrained by what their parents provide them.  In this study, we perceive food fiscal 
policies as a promising incentive mechanism that could create a parental environment 
that supports healthy eating in the family. However, specific factors that influence the 
effectiveness of food fiscal policies have to be taken into account. 
From an economics perspective, this study tries to simulate the choices parents face in 
real world using real choice experiments, which is an incentive-compatible method 
that is easy for consumers to understand. In our experiment, subjects were tested in a 
“closed environment” as they could choose between three alternatives: a healthier and 
an unhealthier product of the same product category, brand and size, or the no-buy 
option. Although in real life, far more many options (brands, sizes, substitutes) are 
available in a grocery store that can create more complex substitution patterns 
resulting from fiscal policies, our small scale choice environment provides a clean 
illustration of the effects of these policies.  
In terms of policy making, our study also illustrates that the magnitude of the effect of 
any fiscal policy can be weakened or enhanced by several other factors. For example, 
our study shows the significant (negative) influence that kids could exert on parental 
choice decisions (i.e., with their pestering power) when it comes to healthier foods. 
On the other hand, our findings suggest that if proper provision of information 
regarding the cause of the price increase/decrease is provided (e.g., on the shelf close 
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to the price), the effect of a food fiscal policy can be enhanced. This finding implies 
that food fiscal policies should be accompanied by information campaigns to become 
more effective. More importantly, our results indicate that although there is an impact 
on healthier choices after the implementation of a fat tax or a subsidy, the 
simultaneous implementation of fat tax and subsidy can further improve healthier 
choices.  
Overall, one of the ways for a fiscal policy that increases the price of some products 
to gain public acceptance is to convince consumers that the revenues from the 
difference in the payable price will be returned to them. This could be done with the 
implementation of subsidies to products considered healthier ensuring that food taxes 
are not more regressive to poor consumers; through educational programs related to 
healthy eating behavior among adults and children; through public information 
campaigns and fitness equipments/parks available to public; as well as through 
funding of the public health system. For example, Reger et al. (1999) reported that 
after a six-week mass media campaign and implementation of media public relation 
strategies in east Virginia to encourage consumers to switch from whole-fat milk (2%) 
to low-fat milk (1%), there was a 17% rise in low fat milk purchases. This effect 
lasted at least six months after the intervention ended.    
Given the context upon which this study was conducted (i.e., in Greece), future 
research should test the robustness of our findings in other places where parenting 
styles, family structures, and eating culture could be different. 
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Appendix A: Full list of choice tasks  
  
Price of 
unhealthier 
alternative 
Price of 
healthier 
alternative 
No-Buy 
Alternative Product category 
Choice task 1: 1.3 1.3 None of these 
Choco Milk 
Beverage 
Choice task 2: 1.62 1.3 None of these 
Choice task 3: 1.3 0.98 None of these 
Choice task 4: 1.62 0.98 None of these 
Choice task 5: 2 2 None of these 
Cheese Choice task 6: 2.5 2 None of these Choice task 7: 2 1.5 None of these 
Choice task 8: 2.5 1.5 None of these 
Choice task 9: 1 1 None of these 
Yogurt Choice task 10: 1.25 1 None of these Choice task 11: 1 0.75 None of these 
Choice task 12: 1.25 0.75 None of these 
Choice task 13: 1.5 1.5 None of these 
Decoy 
Markers 
Choice task 14: 1.5 1.5 None of these 
Choice task 15: 1.5 1.5 None of these 
Choice task 16: 1.5 1.5 None of these 
Choice task 17: 1.2 1.2 None of these 
Decoy 
Pencils 
Choice task 18: 1.2 1.2 None of these 
Choice task 19: 1.2 1.2 None of these 
Choice task 20: 1.2 1.2 None of these 
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Appendix B: Experimental Instructions 
[This is an English translation of the original instructions written in Greek. Text in 
brackets was not shown to subjects.] 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. This study is a children’s 
snack and stationery preference survey. 
 
Υou have been randomly assigned a participant identity number (ID). You will use 
this ID to identify yourself. The ID must be written on the computer screen and on all 
papers handed in today. All information collected is strictly confidential and will only 
be used for this specific project.  
 
Your participation fee is 30€. You will receive a voucher with a value of 30€. The 
voucher can be exchanged for money when you have completed all parts of the study. 
During the study you will be able to make real purchases if you wish to. I will give 
you more details on this part later on. The cost of any purchases you make will be 
deducted from the 30€ participation fee.   
 
If you have any questions you may ask the moderator.  
 
[Depending on the treatment, the experimenter enters the computer lab with the parent 
only or with the parent and the child together. Children that are not participating in the 
real choice experiment in treatments 1 and 3, spend their time in the lobby of the 
computer lab within eye contact distance from their parents. These children can watch 
cartoons or draw using paper and pencils.] 
 
The first thing I want you to do is to examine all the products in this product display. 
You can see 5 product categories: milk drink, cheese, yogurt, pencils and markers. As 
you can see the products within a product category are of the same size and of the 
same brand.  
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[For treatments 2 and 4, where fiscal policy information was made available, the 
following paragraph was read to the participants while they were examining the 
products:]  
“As you can see there are five product categories and each category has two products 
of the same size and brand but with different fat and sugar ingredient content. Now 
imagine that the health minister makes the following announcement on mass media: 
Due to the alarming obesity prevalence rates among children in our country we 
decided to apply the following food fiscal policies on dairy products that are 
commonly consumed by children. From next week, we will impose 3 different fiscal 
policies. The one, which is called fat tax, will increase the price of the product that is 
considered unhealthier by 25%; the second, which is called subsidy, will decrease the 
price of healthier products by 25%; and the third will combine a fat tax with a subsidy 
i.e., there will be a simultaneous increase of the price of the unhealthier product by 
25% and a 25% decrease of the price of the healthier product.] 
 
[Subject is then seated in front of a computer] 
The products that were shown on display are going to appear on your screen in dyads. 
In total you will go through 20 choice tasks. Between tasks different products will 
appear but you might also see the same products at various price levels. In each 
choice task, you can choose between any of the two products or you can choose the 
no-buy option by selecting the “none of these” alternative.  
 
When you complete all choice tasks, one of the choice tasks will be randomly selected 
as a binding task and you will have to purchase the product/alternative that you chose 
in this choice task. The price of the purchased product will be deducted from your 
participation fee. If you chose the “none of these” option in the binding choice task, 
then you won’t purchase any product and the full participation fee will be given to 
you. The random draw for the binding task will be performed in front of you using 
this jar. The jar contains folded papers listing numbers from one to twenty (as many 
as the choice tasks). That is, each choice task has a one out of twenty chance (5%) of 
being binding. More importantly, all tasks are equally likely to be selected as binding. 
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Today, you will purchase at most one product. The purchased product will be given to 
your child to be consumed while you will participate in the second part of this survey 
which is a socio-demographic questionnaire.   
 
Are there any questions? 
[If there are no questions, the experimenter proceeds with starting the computerized 
treatment and subject is instructed to proceed with the choice task.] 
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Appendix C: Manipulation Check Questionnaire  
1. Did you enjoy participating? 
2. Were you bored at any point? 
3. Do you have an idea about what was the purpose of the experiment? 
4. Did you choose based on the information provided to you at the beginning of the 
experiment?  
5. Did you respond based on what you think the experimenter wanted from you 
because you think that the experimenter could see your answers? 
 
 33
Appendix D: Example decision tasks for the market price treatment.  
[This is an English version of the original screens that appeared in Greek for the 
market price treatment. Similar screens were shown for the fat tax, subsidy and both 
treatments with appropriate price adjustments.] 
Choice Task 1
Price: 1.3€
Choose the left choice Choose the right choice
None of these
Confirm
Price: 1.3€
 
Choice Task 2
Price: 1€
Choose the left choice Choose the right choice
None of these
Confirm
Price: 1€
 
Choice Task 3
Price: 2€
Choose the left choice Choose the right choice
None of these
Confirm
Price: 2€
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Choice Task 4
Price: 1.5€
Choose the left choice Choose the right choice
None of these
Confirm
Price: 1.5€
 
Choice Task 5
Price: 1.2€
Choose the left choice Choose the right choice
None of these
Confirm
Price: 1.2€
 
 
 
